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POSICIONAMENTO ESTRATÉGICO E ESTABILIDADE ESTRATÉGICA: QUAL A 
IMPORTÂNCIA PARA O DESEMPENHO? 
 
 
 
RESUMO 
 
Este estudo investiga se as empresas petrolíferas multinacionais de petróleo (MNCs) adotaram 
posicionamento estratégico distinto e se o posicionamento estratégico e desempenho da empresa 
estão relacionados. A análise de cluster de 50 empresas identificaram 10 tipos estratégicos. Apesar 
de não haver diferenças estatisticamente significativas foram encontradas no desempenho futuro 
esperado em uma base anual, houve diferenças estatisticamente significativas no desempenho 
passado entre os tipos estratégicos em cinco dos últimos oito anos (2000 - 2007) do estudo . Além 
disso, a média para todo o período , alguns tipos estratégicos apresentaram desempenho futuro 
esperado superior e alguns alcançado o desempenho passado superior. Além disso , a estabilidade 
em posição estratégica - ou seja, mantendo a mesma posição estratégica para um longo período de 
tempo - foi também associada a um melhor desempenho . 
 
Palavras-chave: Posicionamento Estratégico; Companhias Petrolíferas Multinacionais; 
Desempenho da Empresa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC POSITIONING AND STRATEGIC STABILITY: DOES IT MATTER TO 
PERFORMANCE? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates whether oil multinational oil companies (MNCs) have adopted distinct 
strategic positioning and whether strategic positioning and firm performance are related. Cluster 
analysis of 50 firms identified 10 strategic types. Although no statistically significant differences 
were found in expected future performance on an annual basis, there were statistically significant 
differences in past performance between strategic types in five out of the eight years (2000 – 2007) 
of the study. Also, averaged over the entire period, some strategic types presented higher expected 
future performance and some achieved higher past performance. Moreover, stability in strategic 
positioning – that is, keeping the same strategic positioning for a longer period of time – was also 
associated with better performance.  
 
Keywords: Strategic Positioning; Multinational Oil Companies; Firm Performance. 
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POSICIONAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO Y ESTABILIDAD ESTRATÉGICA: ¿LE 
IMPORTA A RENDIMIENTO? 
 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Este estudio investiga si las compañías petroleras multinacionales petroleras (EMN) han adoptado 
un posicionamiento estratégico distinto y si el posicionamiento estratégico y el desempeño de la 
empresa están relacionados . El análisis de conglomerados de 50 empresas se identificaron 10 tipos 
estratégicos. Aunque no se encontraron diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el rendimiento 
futuro esperado sobre una base anual , no hubo diferencias estadísticamente significativas en los 
resultados anteriores entre los tipos estratégicos en cinco de los ocho años (2000 - 2007) del 
estudio. Además, en promedio durante todo el período , algunos tipos estratégicos presentados 
rendimiento futuro esperado más alto y algunos logrado rentabilidades pasadas superior. Por otra 
parte , la estabilidad en el posicionamiento estratégico - es decir, manteniendo el mismo 
posicionamiento estratégico para un período más largo de tiempo - también se asoció con un mejor 
rendimiento . 
 
Palabras-clave: Posicionamiento Estratégico; Las Compañías Petroleras Transnacionales; 
Desempeño de la Empresa . 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The oil industry plays an important role in the economy, since firms and consumers depend 
heavily on their products, particularly fuels and petrochemicals. Oil companies have experienced 
several transformations, either imposed by governmental policies – for instance, privatization and 
regulation – or forced by changes in the nature of competition, which have led to partnerships, 
mergers, acquisitions, and internationalization. In response to changes in the competitive 
environment, companies need to make decisions about their strategic positioning in order to 
preserve or improve their performance levels, as capital market investors put ever more pressure on 
them. 
The purpose of this study is two-fold: to investigate whether multinationals in the oil industry 
(oil MNCs) differ in their strategic positioning; and to verify whether there seems to be some 
association between strategic positioning and firm performance in the oil industry. 
In order to answer this question, this paper has been organized in five parts. After this 
introduction, a review of the literature is presented to cover concepts of generic competitive 
strategies and of organizational performance. Then, data collection and treatment methods are laid 
out. Findings are subsequently shown and discussed. Finally, conclusions and suggestions for future 
studies close the paper. 
 
 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Literature suggests that several factors seem to bear influence on firms’ performance. In fact 
there are three major areas of influence: the external environment, each company’s idiosyncratic 
characteristics, and the strategic positioning they adopt (McGahan and Porter, 1997, 2002; 
Roquebert, Phillips and Westfall, 1996; Rumelt, 1991).  
In this paper, we are interested in assessing, particularly, the impact of strategy upon 
performance.  
 
2.1 TYPOLOGIES OF GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES 
 
The position of a company’s offer – in terms of the attributes that offer presents to customers 
and their comparison with what is offered by competitors and substitutes – is, in most situations, a 
multidimensional construct.  
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Strategic positioning may be described as the emphasis that a firm employs in each 
competitive method (for instance, branding, quality, services, etc.). However, as the number of 
relevant attributes increases, it may become cumbersome to describe the strategy. 
On the other hand, typologies, or classification schemes, capture the essence of the various 
relevant characteristics, simplifying the understanding and visualization of complex combinations. 
According to Hambrick (1983), the use of typologies reduces the vast array of combinations that a 
researcher would have to consider, given that the types (or categories) of a typology would 
represent general characters (archetypes or gestalts), which would define a holistic package of 
attributes. These archetypes are wholes that represent the simultaneous and conjoint interactions 
taking place (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990), thus better reflecting the complex nature of the 
phenomenon. As Namiki (1994) has put it, the use of profiles makes it possible to compare the 
conjoint impact of distinct patterns of combination of variables. Once the corresponding archetype 
is identified, several other characteristics could be inferred (Miller, 1981). The choice of which 
dimensions would better represent a given construct may be based on theory and on conceptual 
reflections; or, alternatively, the dimensions and categories (types) of the model may be derived 
empirically, from the classification of a set of observations – in this case, one would have a 
taxonomy. 
Two often referenced typologies of generic competitive strategies are Porter’s (1985) and 
Mintzberg’s (1988). 
Porter’s (1985) typology is based on two dimensions: 
 
 competitive advantage over competitors (low cost or differentiation); and 
 breadth of target-market (broad vs. narrow coverage of market segments). 
 
Mintzberg’s (1988) typology implicitly ignores costs and focuses on the distinction between 
five types of differentiation – quality, project, support, image, and low price – and an additional 
strategic positioning based on imitating competitors: non-differentiation. 
However, the implicit supposition in Porter’s (1985) typology that simultaneous search for 
differentiation and low cost would not be possible, in theory, except for (supposedly rare) particular 
circumstances, was criticized by several other researchers who found empirical evidence (e.g., 
Miller and Dess, 1993) and conceptual justifications (e.g., Dess and Davis, 1984; Hill, 1988; and 
Wright, 1987) to argue that emphasis on both competitive dimensions could be simultaneously 
achieved with success. 
14 
 
Strategic Positioning and Strategic Stability: Does it Matter to Performance? 
 
_______________________________ 
Revista Ibero-Americana de Estratégia - RIAE, São Paulo, v. 12, n. 4, p. 09-39, out./dez. 2013. 
Miller and Dess (1993) proposed a typology, according to which the concepts of cost, 
differentiation, and scope of target market would comprise dimensions of strategic positioning. 
Instead of assuming discrete positions, companies would occupy positions in a continuum along the 
three dimensions: level of differentiation, level of cost, and breadth of market scope. Considering, 
in order to simplify the analysis, that each of these dimensions could assume values at three levels 
(e.g., high, middle, and low), there would then be 33 = 27 possible combinations. Nevertheless, only 
some of these combinations would be of practical interest (e.g., the combination between high cost 
and low differentiation has obviously no appeal). On behalf of parsimony, Miller and Dess (1993) 
limited their model to seven more plausible combinations: differentiation + low cost + narrow 
scope; differentiation + low cost + broad scope; differentiation + narrow scope; differentiation + 
broad scope; low cost + narrow scope; low cost + broad scope; and stuck-in-the-middle 
(characterized by an intermediary positioning in each of the three dimensions of cost, 
differentiation, and scope of target-market).  
Chrisman, Hofer and Boulton (1988) suggested a typology that considers, not only an offer’s 
positioning (e.g., low cost or differentiation) and market scope (as in Miller and Dess, 1993), but 
also allows for the possibility of using distinct strategic positioning across the several market 
segments a firm servers (which they called “presence of segment differentiation”). Their 
classification model is based on the following three dimensions (and respective levels on each 
dimension): 
 
1. breadth of market scope  
 broad 
 narrow 
 
2. type of competitive weapon accounting for all or most of the firm’s revenues  
 low cost / low price 
 balanced use of low cost / low price and differentiation (utility)  
 differentiation 
 few or no competitive weapons (i.e., neither lower cost nor differentiation versus 
competitors’ offers) 
 
3. presence of segment differentiation  
 yes (i.e., different types of competitive weapons used in different segments) 
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 no (i.e., same type of competitive weapons used in each of the segments served by the 
company) 
 
The word “utility” was used by Chrisman et al. (1988) to designate a strategic type that would 
simultaneously employ low cost and differentiation methods in their main product/market 
segment(s). It should be noted that the use of low cost in a segment and differentiation in another 
shows diversity per segment (that is, different positioning in different segments) and not necessarily 
utility (which would indicate that both competitive methods would be used at the same time in the 
same segment or segments). A company may also use both methods simultaneously in a given 
segment while using only one of them in another segment – which characterizes diversity per 
segment. So, if the segment (or segments) where both methods are used simultaneously is 
responsible for most corporate revenues, this strategy would be classified as segmented utility or 
segmented utility focus, depending on an either broad or narrow scope, respectively. 
When adopting differentiation as a competitive method, a company would try to incorporate 
new attributes or to increase the level of present attributes in relation to competitors in order to 
attract customer preference. Concerning cost leadership, Chrisman et al. (1988) considered that a 
low cost position per se would not generate competitive advantage unless it was translated into low 
price to customers. Chrisman et al (1988) considered that eliminating or reducing benefits less 
appreciated by customers may develop cost advantage in products that, despite reduced level of 
benefits, would still be differentiated if the product continued to offer the attributes considered 
relevant for the market it is set to serve. The utility strategy could be referred to as a balance 
between cost and benefits, in an attempt to reconcile two competitive advantages and create greater 
economic value in relation to competitors.  
The strategy of no competitive weapon, presented in Chrisman et al.’s (1988) typology, would 
be related to those companies that do not use any particular competitive weapon and are, at most, 
content with meeting excess demand. These companies have no type of competitive advantage, 
except maybe for being in the right place at the right time.  
Considering the combinations of two levels of scope and two levels of diversity in positioning 
per segment with the four competitive methods, Chrisman et al.’s (1988) typology would be 
composed of a set of 2 X 2 X 4 = 16 strategic types. However, a combination of positioning 
diversity per segment with no competitive weapon is internally inconsistent, since without choosing 
any competitive method a company cannot present different competitive methods in different 
segments be it in the case of broad scope or in the case of narrow scope. After excluding these two 
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strategic types, Chrisman et al.’s (1988) typology comprises a total of 14 strategic types (see Table 
1, which presents the association between every strategic type of Chrisman et al. (1988) and the 
respective empirically derived cluster, as detailed further ahead). 
 
Table 1 – Association between the strategic types by Chrisman et al. (1988) and clusters derived in the study 
     
TYPES OF COMPETITIVW METHOD RESPONSIBLE 
FOR MOST CORPORATE REVENUES 
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D
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
co
m
p
et
it
iv
e 
m
et
h
o
d
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
se
g
m
en
ts
 W
it
h
 
d
iv
er
si
ty
 p
er
 
se
g
m
en
t 
B
re
a
d
th
 o
f 
m
a
rk
et
 Broad 
scope cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 3  
Narrow 
scope 
cluster 4 cluster 5 cluster 6  
W
it
h
o
u
t 
d
iv
er
si
ty
 p
er
 
se
g
m
en
t Broad 
scope 
cluster 7 cluster 8 cluster 9 
cluster 
10 
Narrow 
scope cluster 11 cluster 12 cluster 13 
cluster 
14 
 
Source: Chrisman et al. (1988) 
 
2.2 PERFORMANCE 
 
Firms choose a given strategic positioning as a means to achieve higher performance in a 
sustainable manner. Measuring performance, however, is something that requires adequate metrics, 
given the multidimensional nature of the concept to be measured. According to Chakravarthy 
(1986), measurement of performance must reflect the efficiency of a company's positioning in the 
industry and provide managers with some reference on the quality of their decisions, which can be 
made by means of compound indicators composing multiple measurements of the different 
dimensions involved. 
According to Barney (2007), a company presents higher performance when it can actually 
create more economic value than its competitors. Despite the simplicity in this definition of 
performance, it proves to be less than practical since the concept of economic value, as defined by 
the difference in the value of benefits created for the customer and the production costs incurred, is 
difficult to measure. Barney classifies the most common performance measurements in four classes: 
profitability ratios, liquidity ratios, leverage ratios, and activity ratios.  
Past financial data (ROA, ROE or other) may be useful for analysis and comparisons but it is 
a “picture” of a moment in time and says little about the “film” that has been playing (company’s 
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history and past progress) or will be playing (company’s potential future performance). On the other 
hand, present-value measures, such as VPL and Tobin’s Q (Barney, 2007), incorporate expected 
future performance prospects, measured at the present time, and may be appropriate to analyze 
long-term results especially when a company is taking actions that may be detrimental to short-term 
performance (such as R&D expenditures to avoid technological obsolescence, or advertising 
expenditures to boost brand and reputation) as a way to build a stronger position and reap the 
benefits in the future.  
 
2.3 HYPOTHESES 
 
Firms are heterogeneous in terms of their histories, organizational structures and managers’ 
profiles; and they may also face varied market challenges. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
different firms in a given industry may employ different strategic types. This reasoning leads to the 
first hypothesis of this study: 
 
H1: There can be found distinct strategic types among MNCs in the oil industry  
 
It has been argued that performance is influenced by strategy (Dess and Davis, 1984; Kim and 
Lim, 1988; Porter, 1985; Wright et al., 1991). Such assertion leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Distinct strategic types will be associated with distinct levels of performance in the oil industry 
 
Some resources necessary for a firm to develop competitive advantage may have a long 
process of accumulation and may depend on consistent and continued efforts throughout a long 
period of time (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Given this time-dependent pattern one can argue that, if a 
firm keeps changing its strategic positioning, it may not dedicate enough time for its resources to 
accumulate and lead to competitive advantage. This may be particularly true in the oil industry 
where complex new process and product technologies may have long maturation periods. The third 
hypothesis is advanced:  
 
H3: Stability of strategic positioning will be associated with higher levels of performance in the oil 
industry 
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3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
3.1 SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
 
For the purposes of this study, the target population was defined as diversified oil companies 
(that is, acting in more than one product-market segment) operating on the exploration and 
production activity (whether or not operating in other productive activities of the oil chain or related 
industries). The first criterion is justified since Chrisman et al.’s (1988) typology has a dimension 
that refers to different corporate positions across segments, while the second criterion is due to the 
importance of exploration and production activities, since profits therefrom do correspond, not 
rarely, to 70% of the total profits of oil companies. 
The sample was composed of public listed companies appearing the ranking by PIW 
(Petroleum Intelligence Weekly), the main business journal in the industry, whereto other 
companies were added because of their representativeness in the industry, in terms of both their 
market value and the volume of oil produced as of 2007 year end. The final sample was composed 
of 50 companies (Table 2).  
Data about strategic variables and performance indicators were obtained from annual reports 
as well as from other communication and investor relations materials disclosed by the companies. 
Data were collected for the years 2000 to 2007. This horizon was chosen as a function of the 
relative stability in oil prices during this period which was characterized by a high trend started in 
December 1998 that was maintained to the end of 2007, the last year with annual accounting 
statements published when this study was undertaken. 
 
3.2 MEASURES 
 
Table 2 – Sample of companies used in this study 
 
 
ExxonMobil(USA) 
 
ENI (ITA) Devon (USA) Noble (USA) XTO (USA) 
 
BP (UK) 
 
Repsol-YPF (SPA) Anadarko (USA) Suncor (CAN) EOG (USA) 
 
Shell (UK/NL) 
 
Rosnet (RUS) Apache (USA) Murphy Oil (USA) Denbury (USA) 
 
Petrochina (CHI) 
 
Sinopec (CHI) Occidental (USA) MOL (HUN) Plains (USA) 
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Chevron (USA) 
 
Statoil (NOR) CNR (CAN) Nexen (CAN) Pioneer (USA) 
 
Total (FRA) 
 
Marathon (USA) CNOOC (CHI) Santos (AUST) Forest (USA) 
 
Conoco (USA) 
 
OMV (AUS) Talisman (CAN) Imperial (CAN) Cabot (USA) 
 
Petrobras (BRA) 
 
Encana (CAN) Husky (CAN) Newfield (USA) Premier (USA) 
 
Gazprom (RUS) 
 
Petrocanada (CAN) Chesapeake (USA) Pogo (USA) Berry (USA) 
 
Lukoil (RUS) 
 
Hess (USA) Woodside (AUST) Dominion (USA) Questar (USA) 
 
In this study, we chose Chrisman et al.’s (1988) typology to represent the alternatives for a 
company’s strategic positioning. This choice is due to the apparently reasonable fact that oil 
companies may have achieved a position of balancing low costs and differentiation (according to 
theoretical arguments advanced by Hill, 1988). Furthermore, since several of these companies are 
active in different product segments and also in different countries, some may not be employing the 
same strategic positioning in all target markets – and Chrisman et al.’s (1988) typology allows for 
diversity of strategic positioning.  
Broad scope strategies were considered to be those adopted by integrated oil companies 
operating in exploration and production (E&P) activities as well as in refining and distribution. 
Those operating only in E&P were considered as companies of narrow scope strategies. 
Operationalization of the strategic types by Chrisman et al. (1988) is specific to each industry, 
since cost determinants as well as factors defining differentiation vary from industry to industry. 
The competitive methods adopted for this study were enlarged from the 18 methods of a study on 
the competitive strategies adopted by oil companies, conducted by Carneiro (1997), who derived 
those competitive methods from conversations with academic experts and Petrobras (the largest 
Brazilian oil company) executives. After additional conversations with academic and industry 
experts on which variables would be relevant to represent strategic positioning in the oil industry, 
21 strategic variables were finally selected. The operationalization of these 21 variables is presented 
in Table 3. Association of each of those 21 competitive methods with low cost / low price vs. 
differentiation positions was done with the aid of experts. The classification of companies’ 
strategies in terms of competitive weapon and presence (or not) of segment differentiation was 
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based on secondary data. 
 
Table 3 – Strategic variables selected for this study and their operationalization 
 
STRATEGIC VARIABLE 
 
OPERATIONALIZATION 
 
1) Service Level 
 
Sale Expenses / Sales Revenue 
 
2) Sales Financing 
 
Average Receivables Collection Period 
 
3) Product Quality 
 
Refining Conversion Intensity (%) 
 
4) Inventory Level 
 
Number of Inventory Days 
 
5) Control over Distribution Channels 
 
Volume of Sales in Own Service Stations (%) 
 
6) Breadth of Product Line 
 
Availability of Refining Capacity 
 
7) Price Policy 
 
Gross Margin 
 
8) Availability of Raw Material 
 
Volume of Reserves / Volume Produced 
 
9) Innovation in Production Processes 
 
R&D Expenses / Sales Revenue 
 
10) Cost Management 
 
Total Operational Costs / Sales Revenue 
 
11) Capital Structure 
 
Ratio between net debt and capital employed 
 
12) Operational Leverage  
 
Fixed Costs / Total Costs 
 
13) E&P Costs (exploration & production) 
 
Costs of Acquisition + Exploration + Production per barrel 
 
14) Exploratory Efficiency 
 
Percentage of company success in drilling wells 
 
15) Refining Capacity 
 
Production capacity in wholly-owned refineries + proportional capacity 
in partnerships 
 
16) Use of Production Capacity 
 
Volume processed / Refining capacity 
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17) Employee Productivity 
 
Operational profitability / Number of employees 
 
18) Capital Intensity 
 
Operational Capital / Total Revenues 
 
19) Firm Size 
 
Total value of assets 
 
20) Differentiated Presence per Segment 
 
Local margin – Margin in other regions 
 
21) Degree of Internationalization 
 
Local Sales Revenue / Total Sales Revenue 
 
 
 
As for measures of performance, we chose Tobin’s Q as a measure of expected future 
performance and ROCE (return on capital employed) as a measure of past performance. 
In order to create an indicator that could be used as a determinant for new investments, Tobin 
and Brainard (1968) developed a quotient that became known as Tobin’s Q, a variable that was 
successful in different research applications in the area of economics and finance. Defined as the 
ratio between a company’s market value (given by the value of its shares in the stock market) and 
the replacement value of its assets, Tobin’s Q represents an investor assessment of expected future 
profits in comparison with the disbursements that would be necessary to build the company’s 
physical assets from scratch. If Q > 1, it shows that the market expects the company to be able to 
generate cash flow that, discounted to present value, would be higher than the value to replace its 
assets. 
ROCE (return on capital employed) is also a frequently used performance indicator and 
measures the overall efficiency of corporate management to generate operational profits with the 
available assets. While Tobin’s Q is a measure that indicates expected future performances, ROCE 
measures past performance. Chung and Pruitt (1994) developed a simplified methodology for the 
calculation of an approximate Q, a simplification that turned the calculation of Tobin’s Q into an 
easy operation by means of information that is commonly published in financial statements.  
According to Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1995), the capital invested, which is the 
denominator in the ROCE formula, would correspond to the amount employed in company 
operations. It is composed of: operational working capital, fixed assets (net of accumulated 
depreciation) and other assets (already net of short term shareholders’ equities that are exempted 
from interests). One of the limitations of ROCE is that its calculation is based on accounting values, 
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which may undergo a series of distortions and do not, necessarily, correspond to market value 
(Hirschey and Wichern, 1984). 
Considering that corporate business strategies are hardly ever implemented in a one year 
period, this study attempted to identify a company’s strategic positioning in a given year by 
resorting to the average values (moving average) of the strategy variables in the last quarter.  
 
3.3 DATA TREATMENT PROCEDURES 
 
In the accounting years where data referring to a given company’s market value of equity 
were found to be missing, estimated values were calculated on the basis of the first value informed 
in previous years, multiplied by a factor proportional to the rate of net profits obtained in both 
years. This method was particularly useful for estimating the market value of some companies 
privatized in the late 1990's whose shares, in the early years of the timeframe of this study, were not 
yet negotiated in the stock market. 
In order to ensure homogeneity in the distribution of values for the variables under analysis, Z 
transforms of the variables were calculated, thus avoiding distortions resulting from different scales 
adopted in the measurements. 
 
3.4 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
Cluster analysis was used for the identification of strategic groups. According to Hair et al. 
(2005), cluster analysis may be used in an exploratory mode for deriving a taxonomy (empirical 
classification of cases) or in a confirmatory mode, starting from a previous theoretical classification 
that will be compared to empirical data. Here, the cluster analysis was run in a confirmatory mode 
for each year of the period under study, where the generic strategies of Chrisman et al.’s (1988) 
typology were used as the theoretical framework to form clusters (strategic groups) of companies. A 
corresponding cluster was associated to each type of strategy in Chrisman et al.’s (1988) 
classification scheme. The methodology used for cluster formation and analysis followed the 
following steps: 
 
a) For each of the 14 strategic types by Chrisman et al. (1988), the typical values of each of the 
21 strategic variables were defined (shown in Table 3), thus forming theoretical centroid 
references to represent a typical company in each of 14 theoretical clusters; these typical 
values were defined as the value expected, in theory, for each strategic variable (measured in 
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percentiles, at every 12.5% of the distribution of values for each variable) and are presented 
in Tables 4 and 5.  
b) By using the Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity, each of the 50 companies studied 
here was associated with a particular cluster according to the proximity of the values of its 
strategic variables to the theoretical values used to define the clusters; in this procedure 
intra-cluster variations were minimized and inter-cluster variations were maximized. 
c) After each company’s allocation to its respective cluster, the group’s reference (centroid) 
was recalculated. The procedure was repeated until all companies were associated with a 
cluster. As a confirmatory test of model stability, the differences between initial cluster 
centroids and final centroids were not statistically significant. In this procedure, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank (a nonparametric test) was used.  
 
After the strategic groups for each year were formed, we identified the cluster in which a 
company was classified the greatest number of times – this cluster was named the company’s 
“dominant cluster” (or “dominant strategic group”). 
Once the clusters were formed, the average values of each group’s performance variables 
were calculated and Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric H-Test (often viewed as the nonparametric 
equivalent of the parametric one-way analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA)) was run to check for 
differences in performance variables across strategic groups (clusters). 
Nonparametric statistical methods were needed because, in some cases, data did not comply 
with the assumptions for the correct use of parametric methods, particularly as far as 
homocedasticity is concerned. 
Based on the dominant strategic group criterion, the companies were associated with the 
clusters corresponding to their more frequent positioning and a new comparison of performance 
indicators was conducted, this time with the average performance values for the companies in the 
entire eight-year period. In case a company had employed two types of positioning for the same 
number of years (e.g., XTO), the most recent positioning was defined as the dominant.  
Additionally, companies were classified in two groups according to the number of years they 
stuck to their dominant cluster: up to four years versus more than four years. New tests were run in 
order to verify possible association between stability of strategy positioning and performance. 
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Table 4 – Theoretical values (percentiles) of the strategic variables of each strategic type of Chrisman et al.’s 
(1988) typology with differentiation per segment 
 
  
BROAD SCOPE 
 
NARROW SCOPE 
Competitive 
Method 
 
Low Cost* 
 
Utility ** Diferentiation None Low Cost * Utility ** Diferentiation None 
Service Level 
 
3 
 
6 6  2 5 5  
Funding to 
Sales 
 
3 
 
6 6  2 5 5  
Product 
Quality 
 
3 
 
5 7  1 3 5  
Inventory 
Level 
 
2 
 
5 6  2 5 6  
Control of 
Dist. Chan. 
 
3 
 
5 7  1 1 1  
Breadth of 
Product Line 
 
1 
 
1 1  0 0 0  
Price Policy 
 
1 
 
3 5  3 5 7  
Availab. of 
Raw Mats. 
 
7 
 
5 4  7 5 4  
Innov. in 
Prod. Procs. 
 
7 
 
6 3  6 5 2  
Cost 
Management  
 
3 
 
6 7  2 5 6  
Capital 
Structure 
 
6 
 
6 6  2 2 2  
Operational 
Leverage 
 
7 
 
6 4  6 5 3  
E&P Costs 
 
2 
 
2 2  6 6 6  
Exploratory 
Efficiency 
 
7 
 
5 3  7 5 3  
Refining 
Capacity 
 
7 
 
5 2  1 1 1 
 
 
Use of Ref. 
Capacity 
 
7 
 
5 2  1 1 1  
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Employee 
Prod. 
 
6 
 
5 3  7 5 3  
Capital 
Intensity 
 
3 
 
5 7  2 4 6  
Company 
Size 
 
6 
 
6 6  2 2 2  
Dif. Presence 
p/ Segment 
 
6 
 
6 6  6 6 6  
Degree of 
International. 
 
6 
 
6 6  6 6 6  
 
* low cost / low price 
** balanced use of low cost / low price and differentiation 
 
Basically, the difference between measuring performance variables in an year-to-year basis 
and doing so in accordance with the dominant cluster criterion (long term) is that, in the former, 
moving averages of three accounting years were used, whereas, in the latter, performance variables 
averages for the entire period were used. The effect of this latter approach is to further mitigate the 
year-to-year variations observed in company performance and positioning, and to provide the 
grounds for a more stable analysis of the relation between a company’s strategic positioning to 
performance.  
 
Table 5 – Theoretical values (percentiles) of the strategic variables in each strategic type of Chrisman et al.’s 
(1988) typology without differentiation per segment 
 
  
BROAD SCOPE 
 
NARROW SCOPE 
Competitive 
Method 
 
Low Cost* 
 
Utility ** Diferentiation None Cost Price Utility Diferentiation None 
Service Level 
 
3 
 
6 6 4 2 5 5 4 
Funding to 
Sales 
 
3 
 
6 6 4 2 5 5 4 
Product 
Quality 
 
3 
 
5 7 4 1 3 5 4 
Inventory 
Level 
 
2 
 
5 6 4 2 5 6 4 
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Control of 
Dist. Chan. 
 
3 
 
5 7 4 1 1 1 1 
Breadth of 
Product Line 
 
1 
 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Price Policy 
 
1 
 
3 4 4 3 5 7 4 
Availab. of 
Raw Mats. 
 
7 
 
5 4 4 7 5 4 4 
Innov. in 
Prod. Procs. 
 
7 
 
6 3 4 6 5 2 4 
Cost 
Management  
 
3 
6 7 4 2 5 6 4 
Capital 
Structure 
 
6 
 
6 6 6 2 2 2 2 
Operational 
Leverage 
 
7 
 
6 4 4 6 5 3 4 
E&P Costs 
 
2 
 
2 2 2 6 6 6 6 
Exploratory 
Efficiency 
 
7 
 
5 3 4 7 5 3 4 
Refining 
Capacity 
 
7 
 
5 2 4 1 1 1 1 
Use of Ref. 
Capacity 
 
7 
 
5 2 4 1 1 1 1 
Employee 
Prod. 
 
6 
 
5 3 4 7 5 3 4 
Capital 
Intensity 
 
3 
 
5 7 4 2 4 6 4 
Company 
Size 
 
6 
 
6 6 6 2 2 2 2 
Dif. Presence 
p/ Segment 
 
2 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Degree of 
International. 
 
2 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
* low cost / low price 
** balanced use of low cost / low price and differentiation 
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4 FINDINGS 
 
Tables 6 and 7 present the average values of Tobin’s Q and ROCE performance variables for 
the companies belonging to the clusters (strategic groups) that were formed, on an annual basis, in 
the period under study. Blank cells mean that no firms were associated with a given cluster in the 
respective year. At the bottom of the table, there are values of the chi-square statistics calculated for 
the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test each year. At the .10 significance level, no statistically significant 
differences in Tobin’s Q values could be found across the clusters for any given year, except for 
year 2007 (significance level < .08). Consequently, there is no statistical evidence that strategic 
positioning would be associated with differences in expected future performance. On the other 
hand, a comparison of ROCE values paints a different picture. Except for the period 2004-2006, one 
can say that at least two clusters presented statistically significant (at .10 level or lower) differences 
in performance. 
 
Table 6 – Average Tobin’s Q for the strategic groups 
 
 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
Cluster 1 
 
2.3000 - - - - - - 1.4962 
 
Cluster 2 
 
1.3201 1.4521 1.3393 1.2612 1.2312 1.4390 1.4609 1.8683 
 
Cluster 3 
 
- 1.1372 1.1178 1.1028 1.1869 1.2461 1.2699 1.4148 
 
Cluster 4 
 
- - - 1.3070 1.1943 1.2436 1.4789 1.4798 
 
Cluster 5 
 
1.3646 1.4232 1.3592 1.1432 1.3448 1.2021 1.3614 1.3301 
 
Cluster 6 
 
1.3770 1.1804 1.1652 1.2378 1.3149 2.2406 2.4146 - 
 
Cluster 7 
 
- - - - - - - - 
 
Cluster 8 
 
1.6943 1.9658 1.6914 1.7196 1.5664 1.6021 1.7889 2.0107 
 
Cluster 9 
 
- 0.8307 0.8569 0.9928 1.0885 1.3176 1.1914 1.2101 
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Cluster 10 
 
1.0901 1.1150 1.1235 1.1644 1.2316 1.4599 1.8479 1.7684 
 
Cluster 11 
 
1.5413 1.5944 1.5029 1.3996 -  1.1665 2.4158 
 
Cluster 12 
 
1.0750 0.7137 1.1477 1.5450 1.6676 1.5358 1.3851 1.8215 
 
Cluster 13 
 
1.3694 - - - - - - - 
 
Cluster 14 
 
1.5947 1.3296 1.3962 1.2738 1.5038 1.7374 1.7138 1.9000 
 
Chi-Square 
 
10.2857 13.9591 12.1276 12.4532 11.3602 10.8866 15.4908 16.9658 
 
Df 
 
9 9 9 10 9 9 10 10 
 
Asymp. Sig. 
 
0.3279 0.1238 0.2062 0.2559 0.2518 0.2836 0.1152 0.0751 
 
 
Table 7 – Average ROCE for the strategic groups 
 
 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
Cluster 1 
 
13.69% - - - - - - 23.76% 
 
Cluster 2 
 
10.57% 14.77% 14.69% 12.68% 14.19% 19.88% 22.57% 18.09% 
 
Cluster 3 
- 11.32% 11.69% 9.79% 11.24% 14.58% 16.99% 18.08% 
 
Cluster 4 
 
- - - 9.87% 10.15% 13.39% 15.83% 16.66% 
 
Cluster 5 
 
7.84% 10.77% 11.51% 9.48% 12.05% 14.56% 17.41% 14.79% 
 
Cluster 6 
 
9.09% 9.46% 13.17% 13.66% 15.01% 18.99% 21.46% - 
 
Cluster 7 
 
- - - - - - - - 
 
Cluster 8 
 
9.90% 12.93% 14.51% 15.34% 15.25% 16.53% 19.34% 25.07% 
 
Cluster 9 
 
- 6.64% 8.20% 9.89% 12.72% 15.98% 16.10% 16.68% 
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Cluster 10 
 
9.65% 13.25% 14.06% 15.05% 16.01% 18.80% 23.15% 22.78% 
 
Cluster 11 
 
18.23% 24.08% 22.62% 17.33% - - 12.51% 27.45% 
 
Cluster 12 
 
2.92% 0.99% 6.41% 12.28% 13.74% 14.76% 16.47% 15.97% 
 
Cluster 13 
 
4.39% - - - - - - - 
 
Cluster 14 
 
6.24% 16.70% 15.22% 12.40% 13.77% 18.42% 16.87% 16.88% 
 
Chi-Square 
 
16.4931 22.0347 18.8378 18.8016 9.5805 11.5139 14.2586 16.4267 
 
Df 
 
9 9 9 10 9 9 10 10 
 
Asymp. Sig. 
 
0.0573 0.0088 0.0266 0.0429 0.3855 0.2421 0.1615 0.0881 
 
 
So it seems that expectations about future performance (Tobin’s Q) were not, later on, 
confirmed by actual results (ROCE), that is, while (ex-ante) expectations were about the same, 
actual (ex-post) results differed across strategy types. Such finding suggests that, although investors 
seem to believe that distinct strategy types may, per se, lead to similar performance results (a 
phenomenon of expected equifinality), actual results (measured ex-post) indicate otherwise. 
It should be noted, however, that the specific companies that populated each of the clusters 
may not have been the same across each of the eight years of the study. 
The strategic positioning of each company for each year is presented in Table 8. The dominant 
cluster column indicates the cluster where the company remained the longest as well as the duration 
of this permanence, measured in number of (not necessarily consecutive) years. An analysis of the 
data in Table 8 shows that some companies moved from a given cluster to another with frequent 
differences in their strategic positioning. Some companies, on the other hand, remained in the same 
cluster for the entire period, which is a sign of stability in their strategic positioning.  
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Table 8 – Movement of companies among strategic groups 
 
Companies 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Dominant 
Cluster 
Nr. of 
Years 
Anadarko 14 5 5 5 4 4 14 5 5 4 
Apache 5 14 14 14 5 4 4 14 14 4 
Berry 11 11 11 11 12 14 14 12 11 4 
BP 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 7 
Cabot 5 5 12 12 14 14 14 12 12 3 
Chesapeake 13 14 14 14 4 12 11 14 14 4 
Chevron 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 5 
CNOOC 11 11 11 11 14 14 14 11 11 5 
CNR 11 14 14 14 14 12 12 4 14 4 
Conoco 10 3 8 3 3 2 2 1 3 3 
Denbury 13 14 14 14 14 12 14 14 14 6 
Devon 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 14 5 4 
Dominion 6 14 14 14 14 12 12 4 14 4 
Encana 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 
ENI 2 2 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 5 
EOG 6 5 14 12 14 14 4 14 14 4 
Exxon 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 6 
Forest 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 
Gazprom 2 2 2 2 2 8 8 2 2 6 
Hess 10 3 3 3 8 9 3 8 3 4 
Husky 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 
Imperial 8 8 8 8 8 9 10 8 8 6 
Lukoil 2 2 2 2 2 8 8 2 2 6 
Marathon 10 3 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 
MOL 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 
Murphy 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 
Newfield 5 5 5 4 4 14 14 12 5 3 
Nexen 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 
Noble 5 5 5 5 5 14 14 14 5 5 
Occidental 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 7 
OMV 10 3 9 3 9 9 9 9 9 5 
Petrobras 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 8 7 
Petrocanada 10 3 8 8 8 10 3 8 8 4 
Petrochina 8 8 8 8 9 8 8 2 8 6 
Pioneer 5 14 14 14 5 12 5 5 5 4 
Plains 11 11 11 11 12 12 14 12 11 4 
Pogo 5 5 5 4 4 14 14 5 5 4 
Premier 12 12 12 5 14 14 14 14 14 4 
Questar 6 5 14 12 12 12 14 12 12 4 
Repsol 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 
Rosneft 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 8 7 
Santos 6 14 14 14 14 12 4 14 14 5 
Shell 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 7 
Sinopec 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 9 6 
Statoil 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 
Suncor 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Talisman 5 5 14 14 5 12 4 4 5 3 
Total 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 7 
Woodside 6 14 14 14 14 6 6 14 14 5 
XTO 12 14 14 12 12 12 14 14 14 4 
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Table 9 classifies companies according to their dominant cluster. Clusters 2, 5, and 8, which 
are comprised of companies that tried to obtain competitive advantage by means of balanced use of 
differentiation strategies and cost control, were more populated, as was cluster 14 (narrow-scope 
companies with no apparent differentiation or cost advantage). 
 
Table 9 – Strategic groups defined according to dominant cluster 
2000 - 2007 COST/PRICE 
 
UTILITY (COST + 
DIFFERENTIATION) 
 
DIFFERENTIATION NONE 
W
it
h
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 p
er
 s
eg
m
en
t B
ro
a
d
 
CLUSTER 1 
 
 
CLUSTER 2 
BP 
Chevron 
Exxon 
Gazprom 
Lukoil 
Shell 
Total 
 
CLUSTER 3 
Marathon 
Murphy 
Repsol 
Conoco 
Hess 
 
N
a
rr
o
w
 
CLUSTER 4 
 
CLUSTER 5 
Anadarko 
Devon 
Forest 
Nexen 
Noble 
Pioneer 
Pogo 
Talisman 
Newfield 
 
CLUSTER 6 
Occidental 
 
W
it
h
o
u
t 
d
iv
er
si
ty
 p
er
 s
eg
m
e
n
t B
ro
a
d
 
CLUSTER 7 
 
CLUSTER 8 
Imperial 
Petrobras 
PetroCanada 
PetroChina 
Rosneft 
Suncor 
 
CLUSTER 9 
ENI 
MOL 
OMV 
Sinopec 
CLUSTER 10 
EnCana 
Husky 
Statoil 
N
a
rr
o
w
 CLUSTER 11 
Berry 
CNOOC 
Plains 
CLUSTER 12 
Questar 
Cabot 
CLUSTER 13 
 
 
CLUSTER 14 
Apache 
CNR 
EOG 
Chesapeake 
Denbury 
Dominion 
Woodside 
Premier 
Santos 
XTO 
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As can be seen in Table 9, companies targeting a broad market scope do not often (or at all) 
employ low cost / low price strategies. As for narrow scope companies, there can be observed more 
variety of dominant strategic positioning.  
This result is consistent with the study assumptions since, by our definition, broad scope 
companies are integrated companies operating in several steps of the chain of activities that add 
complementary value to the basic product – oil –, thereby differentiating their offer in relation to 
that of narrow scope companies. 
Concerning the main strategic groups of broad scope and differentiation per segment, cluster 2 
(companies that adopt utility as competitive method) is found to have been formed by companies 
operating globally and achieving highest revenues and net profits. These are differentiated offer 
companies that, by virtue of the scale of their operations, have also achieved good performance in 
the variables related to cost. Cluster 3 (of companies that adopt differentiation as a competitive 
method) was formed by companies that, despite operating globally, do not benefit from gains of 
scale like their peers from cluster 2. With regards to the main strategic groups of broad scope and 
without differentiation per segment, clusters 8 (of companies that adopt utility as competitive 
method), 9 (of companies that adopt differentiation as competitive method), and 10 (of companies 
that adopt no competitive method) are found to have been formed by companies, in average, of low 
degree of internationalization with a focus on their respective regional markets, which, by 
definition, represents lesser opportunities for differentiation per geographic segment than 
companies from clusters 2 and 3. In these groups, a greater number of state-controlled companies is 
found, which explains the regional emphasis of their operations. 
Concerning the dominant strategic group of narrow scope and with differentiation per 
segment, cluster 5 (of companies that adopt utility as competitive method) is found to be formed by 
US and Canadian companies of global operations, considered large size participants in the upstream 
segment. These are companies that, in the time horizon of this study, have changed their positioning 
more frequently in relation to the others. Concerning the dominant strategic group of narrow scope 
and without differentiation per segment, cluster 14 (of companies without defined competitive 
method) is found to be formed mostly by US companies of regional operations considered middle 
size participants in the upstream segment. Like cluster 5 companies, these too have changed their 
positioning more frequently, having stayed, in average, about four years in their dominant cluster. 
Table 10 presents the average values of performance indicators – in the entire period of 2000 
through 2007 – for the companies grouped according to the dominant cluster criterion (including 
their performance in those years when they employed some strategic positioning other than their 
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dominant positioning). The highest value of Tobin’s Q was observed in cluster 8, corresponding to 
broad scope companies without diversity per segment that have adopted a balanced differentiation 
strategy with cost control. This strategic group also presented the second best average ROCE. 
 
Table 10 – Average value of performance indicators across dominant clusters (2000-2007) 
 
Dominant Cluster 
 
2 3 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 14 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
1.39 1.16 1.32 1.32 1.89 1.06 1.31 1.71 1.59 1.53 
 
ROCE 
 
0.16 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.14 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests indicate that there are statistically significant differences (between at 
least two clusters) in average performance – considering the entire period 2000-2007 –, both in 
terms of Tobin’s Q (.10 level) and of ROCE (.02 level) across clusters formed according to the 
dominant cluster criterion. For example, in the eight-year period, cluster 11 (focus cost strategy, i.e., 
narrow market scope, emphasis on low-cost / low price, and the same competitive weapons used in 
all segments) performed better while clusters 3, 5, 9 and 12 (comprised of companies with broad-
scope differentiation or with narrow-scope utility, irrespective of differentiated presence) performed 
worse in terms of past performance (ROCE). As for expected future performance (Tobin’s Q), 
cluster 8 (mass market utility) performed better while cluster 9 (segmented utility focus) performed 
worse. This means that, taking a longer term (rather than annual) view of strategic positioning, there 
are statistically significant differences, both in past performance as well as in expected future 
performance, that is, some strategies seem to pay-off in the long term.  
Comparing the results from this analysis of long term strategic positioning based on the 
dominant cluster criterion with the results obtained from the annual analysis, one can conjecture 
that shareholders’ perceived value in relation to the strategies adopted in the different clusters can 
only be verified as the horizon of the analysis is extended, which represents an indication that 
perceived value seems to be related to long term positioning.  
Table 11 shows the average values of performance variables according to the length of time 
each company remained in its respective dominant group. The sample was divided between 
companies that stayed up to four years and those that stayed more than four years in the same 
(dominant) cluster.  
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Table 11 – Effect of strategic stability in company performance 
 
Period of Permanence 
 
  
Tobin’s Q 
 
ROCE 
 
Up to 4 years 
Mean 1.3995 0.1353 
N 20 20 
Standard Dev.  0.2535 0.0300 
 
More than 4 years 
Mean 1.4630 0.1509 
N 30 30 
Standard Dev. 0.5499 0.0475 
 
Total 
Mean 1.4376 0.1446 
N 50 50 
Standard Dev. 0.4526 0.0418 
 
 
According to the results presented, 30 out of the 50 companies analyzed herein stuck to a 
given strategic group for more than half of the eight years under analysis, whereas 20 companies 
changed their strategies more frequently and did not repeat the same strategy in more than four 
years. The effect of varying strategic positioning apparently bears some impact on company 
performance. Besides obtaining better ROCE, companies that kept their strategies for a longer 
period of time (i.e., maintained the same positioning for at least five of the eight years under 
analysis) obtained better results in terms of expected future performance (Tobin’s Q). This result is 
an indication that investors seemed to have perceived greater value in the stability of strategic 
position. However, such performance differences should be viewed as indicative only, given that 
results of Kruskal-Wallis H-tests were not statistically significant (p < .89 for Tobin’s Q and p < .22 
for ROCE). 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
 
The main objective of this research was to investigate whether multinationals in the oil 
industry have adopted distinct strategic positioning and whether there seems to be some association 
between strategic positioning and firm performance. A cluster analysis of 50 MNCs, whereby the 
centroids were theoretically defined after Chrisman, et al.’s (1998) typology of generic strategies 
(operationalized by the relative emphasis on 21 competitive methods), identified 10 distinct 
strategic types employed by oil MNCs, thus corroborating H1.  
Although no statistically significant differences could be found in the expectations of future 
performance (measured as Tobin’s Q) on an annual basis, there were, however, statistically 
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significant differences in the actual past performance (measured as ROCE – return on capital 
employed) between at least two strategic types in five out of the eight years (2000 – 2007) of the 
study. Further analysis indicated that, on the long run, some strategic types did present higher 
expected future performance and some (not necessarily the same) achieved higher past performance 
(both performance results averaged over the eight-year period). So, results provide partial support 
for H2.  
The relatively extensive window of time employed (eight years) has entailed the possibility of 
analyzing company performance on both an annual basis and a long term perspective. In fact, 
stability in strategic positioning (i.e., sticking to a given strategy for a longer period of time) also 
was associated (although not statistically significant) with better performance (both past and 
expected future), corroborating H3. All in all, findings indicate that strategy seems to bear an effect 
on performance in the oil industry.  
Is should be noted that Chrisman et al. (1988) did not suggest that a given strategic 
positioning (among the 14 in their typology) would necessarily lead to better (or worse thereof) 
performance than the others. In fact their typology is descriptive rather than normative. That is why 
it is interesting to investigate whether there might be some association between strategic positioning 
and performance and whether such associations might be contingent on particular circumstances of 
the industry, the temporal frame or other environment or firm variables.  
From an academic perspective, this study indicates that Chrisman et al.’s (1988) typology 
seems to be adequate for the classification of MNC’s strategies in the oil industry both in terms of 
descriptive and explanatory perspectives, since competitive strategies could be mapped and 
consistent groups were formed and, furthermore, associations between strategic types and 
performance were found. The analyses developed in this research have brought forth not only the 
possibility of a company being differentiated and, and at the same time, presenting low operational 
cost, but also pointed at a group of companies that used this competitive method as the one where 
shareholders’ perceived value was greater.  
The findings can also be helpful from a practical standpoint. If further studies indicate that a 
given strategic type seems to lead to better performance in the oil industry, managers can direct 
efforts in order to develop such strategic positioning. However, the ability of a given positioning to 
provide better results may be contingent on the characteristics of the companies themselves and on 
environmental circumstances – a point that was not investigated in the present study – and on 
consistently pursuing the strategy instead of moving from a given strategic type to another. 
This study has some limitations. First, it should be acknowledged that findings might not have 
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been the same had different (conceptually acceptable) definitions of the theoretical centroids of the 
strategy types been employed.  
Second, the very design of the research does not immediately support inferences of cause-
effect relationships. In fact, the association between strategic positioning and performance 
uncovered in this study is merely indicative and should be further investigated with other 
multivariate techniques.  
One should be careful before extending these findings to other industries. The oil industry has 
many idiosyncrasies (commodity-like, scale-economies, political interference, volatility in prices, 
tacit collusion among large players, regulation, among others particular features), so that the very 
strategic types found in this study might not be found in other industries; moreover, the types of 
strategy that would lead to better (worse) performance might differ in other industries. 
Future studies could apply the methodology used in this study to a horizon that will include 
2008 and 2009 accounts in order to detect occasional changes to strategic groupings that may have 
occurred, given oil price variations.  
Another interesting line of investigation would be a modification of the concept of 
segmentation. As adopted in this study, segmentation followed the geographic criterion. 
Alternatively, a criterion of segmentation per business units could be used, where diversity per 
segment would be measured as the company’s positioning in its different areas of operations. Still 
another suggestion could be to test the use of other performance variables to measure company 
performance and also the use of a multi-dimension approach to performance measurement. 
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